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Abstract 
 
From the end of 2013 to the end of 2015, Brazil faced serious challenges to supply its demand 
for electricity due to a prolonged drought in the Southeast and Northeast regions with the consequent 
loss of hydroelectric generation. This paper presents an historical analysis of major world energy crises 
from 1988 to 2015 and in Brazil from 1924 to 2015. Analysing the natural river flow of key Brazilian 
dams from 1931 until 2017, this paper suggests that hydropower generation in Brazil has a 10 to 15 
years cyclical pattern of hydropower generation. The periods of drought in this cyclical pattern usually 
coincides with energy crises due to the reduction in hydropower generation. It was found that the drought 
in 2015 had an impact of 110 TWh in hydropower generation, from which 25 TWh are due to head loss 
and 70 TWh are from lack of stored hydropower in July of 2014. In addition, 48 TWh were not generated 
due to delays in the construction of new power plants. Other causes of the Brazilian energy crisis of 
2015 are presented and the overall electricity generation impact of these causes are compared. In 
addition, this paper presents the impacts on the energy, water and food supply sectors in Brazil, and the 
strategies employed to reduce the impact of the crises. With the intention of preventing future energy 
crises, the paper then shows the potential alternatives to improve electricity supply security in Brazil, 
particularly in terms of diversifying and widening the share of renewable sources and increasing the 
energy storage potential of the country. 
Keywords: Electricity Crisis, Water Crisis, Energy Security, Climate Change Adaptation.  
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Highlights  
 
• Historical review of Brazilian energy crises from 1924 until 2015. 
• Analysis of a hydropower generation cyclical pattern of 10 to 15 years in Brazil.  
• Quantitative comparison of the causes of the energy crises in 2015. 
• Main impacts from the energy crisis of 2015 in the energy, water and food sectors.  
• Possible solutions to avoid future energy crises. 
 
Abbreviations 
 
ANEEL – Brazilian Electricity Regulatory Agency 
ECS – Energy Crop Storage 
EPE – Energy Research Office 
GDP – Gross Domestic Product 
IBGE – Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics  
ONS – Brazilian Electricity Grid Operator 
PDE – Ten-Year Energy Plan 
PLD – Spot Market Electricity Price 
SIN – Brazilian Interconnected Electricity System 
SPS – Seasonal-Pumped-Storage 
 
1.  Introduction 
Electricity sector crises originate for different reasons, such as Nuclear power disasters, for 
example, in Fukushima, Japan [1], unregulated energy markets as in California [2, 3] and Chile [4], 
rapid surge electricity demand and sluggish investments in the electricity sector as in Pakistan [5, 6, 7, 
8] and Bangladesh [9], macroeconomic crisis as in Argentina [10], extended droughts affecting 
hydroelectric generation as in Nepal [11] and Brazil [12]. Details on the major causes and resulting 
actions for these crises are presented in [13, 14, 15, 16]. Looking at the bigger picture there is a global 
energy change happening with the aim to replace fossil fuel alternatives for renewable energy sources, 
with all the resulting consequences [17].  
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With the intention of providing secure [18] and affordable electricity supply services, countries 
have implemented regulatory reforms in the electricity supply industry [10, 19]. However, some 
regulations are applicable to one country but not to others [20]. Electricity supply and crisis management 
is a particularly complex issue in developing countries in Africa, such as Ghana, Cameroon, Ethiopia, 
where most of the population does not have access to electricity [21, 22].  
This paper attempts to describe some of the causes and impacts of the energy and water crises 
in Brazil, and proposes some suggestions for improvement. The main contributions of this paper are to 
highlight that Brazil has been suffering from an energy crisis with a frequency of 10 to 15 years, i.e. the 
years 1924, 1944, 1955, 1964, 1986, 2001 and 2015. This crisis pattern is due to systematic and climatic 
problems that should be resolved with short, medium and long-term measures as proposed in this article. 
In addition, this article highlights the main impacts from the energy and water crises so that strategies 
can be made to better prepare for future crises, and propose possible solutions to prevent future energy 
crises. 
Historically, the power sector in Brazil has been plagued by multiple power crises of different 
duration and geographical scope. In the great majority of the cases, the causes of the crises were 
associated with climatic conditions, since Brazil has historically been very dependent on hydroelectricity 
[13]. The first recorded energy crisis in Brazil happened in 1924-1925 with a drought in the Tiête river 
and affected the city of São Paulo. Table 1 presents the previous crises in Brazil, including their 
respective reasons and the main impacted regions. Another intense energy crisis happened between 1953 
and 1955, when the hydropower stored in the reservoirs reached very low levels and there was energy 
rationing in the cities of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. The power outages reached 5 to 7 hours a day in 
Rio de Janeiro. In Săo Paulo power cuts, without prior notice to the public, were quite common [23]. 
Both cities were again subject to rationing in 1963 and 1964, as the country faced an accelerated growth 
in the consumption of electricity and the investments failed to attend the increase in consumption [24]. 
In 1986, the Southeast region was threatened by electricity rationing, as occurred in the South region in 
the same year [13]. Emergency measures were taken, such as daylight saving time throughout the 
national territory [25]. Rationing also occurred in the Northeast between March 1987 and January 1988 
due to two basic causes: the first, due to the low volume of water in the São Francisco basin and the 
second due to the delay in schedules of planned hydroelectric projects, caused by financial problems 
[26, 13].  
Table 1: Previous crises in Brazil and their main causes [13, 27, 24]. 
Period State/Regions Major causes 
1924-1925 São Paulo Drought in Tietê river and its tributaries. 
1938-1947 São Paulo Difficulty to import equipment due to World War II. 
1950-1957 Southeast Drought and demand increase. 
1951-1964 
(intermittent) Rio de Janeiro Drought in Paraíba river and lack of generation capacity. 
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1963-1964 São Paulo Rio de Janeiro 
Drought: drastic reduction in river flow in the Paraíba and Piraí 
rivers. 
1967 Rio de Janeiro Flooding of Nilo Peçanha Plant. 
1986 South Drought in the Southern Region. 
1987-1988 Northeast Drought in the Northeast Region. 
1995-1999 Manaus Lack of investment due to poor regulations. 
2001-2002 
Nationwide, 
except in the 
South Region 
Drought in the Southeast, Northeast and North regions, and 
delay in the expansion of thermal generation and transmission 
lines. 
2014-2015 Nationwide Drought in the Southeast, Northeast, South and North regions. 
 
In 2001, five years after reforms in the energy sector, Brazil went through a severe energy crisis, 
which by far dwarfed the previous crises in size, duration, geographical scope and complexity [13]. A 
dry summer1 arrived when the water levels of the Brazilian dam system were at low levels, leading to a 
water shortage that culminated in a rationing of electricity consumption with penalties for over-
consumption. Unclear market rules led to major lawsuits from different parties, leaving the electricity 
market in chaos. The official government explanation for the crisis was the unexpected drought of the 
first months of 2001 that added to a series of unfavourable rain falls in the previous years, 1999 and 
2000, leading to the acute water shortage of 2001 [28]. The maximum storage levels for each year were 
1998 – 83%, 1999 – 70%, 2000 – 59%, 2001 – 41% [29]. 
From June 2001 to February 2002, Brazilians were obliged to restrict electricity usage by 20%, 
on average. During the 1990–2000 period, there was an increase of 52.3% in electricity consumption, 
whereas total generation capacity increased by only 41.2%. The gap between consumption and installed 
capacity contributed to the inevitable collapse in 2001 [30]. 
Several papers have been published about the 2001 energy-rationing crisis. Franchito and Rao 
(2008) [31] proposed a climatological methodology to predict droughts in the Southeast of Brazil so that 
the energy sector can respond appropriately to reduce its impact. Simões and Barros (2007) [32] 
highlighted that loss of water through evaporation-transpiration impacts hydropower generation during 
a drought, increasing its vulnerability to changes in climate. Souza and Soares (2007) [33] argued that 
the electricity demand was not significantly reduced through electricity conservation campaigns and the 
Government’s request to reduce consumption. It only leads to a considerable reduction when 
compulsory electricity cut-offs would be implemented if the customer did not reduce consumption. 
Araújo (2006) [12] gives a detailed analysis of the Brazilian energy market reform, its impact on the 
2001 crisis and also lists the causes [34]. Cavaliero and Silva (2005) [35] argued that the 2001 crisis 
increased debate on the need to diversify the grid, reducing the share of hydropower and increasing 
generation from other renewable energy sources, which is similar to what is happening at present. Other 
1 Summer is the rainy season for most part of Brazil. 
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authors blame the crisis of 2001 on unfinished structural and institutional reforms [36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 
41, 42] and on gas-fired power development project finance issues [43, 44, 45].  
As shown in Figure 1, in July 2001, the monthly demand had to be considerably reduced, 
because there was not enough energy stored in the Southeast hydropower dams to safely guarantee 
electricity supply for the following years. The government then decided to reduce energy consumption 
for residential consumers by 20% and for industrial and commercial consumers by 15 to 25%, depending 
on the importance of the economic activity [46], so that the demand would fall and the reservoirs could 
then fill up again [33]. The Aluminium industry suffered the hardest impact from energy rationing [47], 
other industries also suffered with the crisis, including the paper industry [48]. The impact of the energy 
crisis could even be seen from space at night, due to the reduction in lighting [49]. During this period, 
energy efficiency programs were established for people switching from incandescent lightbulbs to 
fluorescent lightbulbs [35], to replace old refrigerators for more efficient models, among other energy 
saving measures. This resulted in a considerable demand reduction. As it can be seen in Figure 1, the 
demand only returned to previous levels in 2004 as the energy and economic crisis reduced the demand 
for electricity.  
 
Figure 1: Monthly hydropower storage, demand and total storage capacity in Brazil [50]. 
Since 2001 much has happened to reduce the risks of a new energy crisis. Transmission lines 
were installed, increasing the ability to transfer electricity from one region to another (in 2001, the 
energy that could have been generated in the South or in the North could not be transferred to the 
Southeast and Northeast due to lack of transmission lines). The country also received considerable 
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generation capacity reinforcement, which reached 42 GW of thermoelectric power plants and other 
renewables in 2014 [51]. 
Even with these improvements to the Brazilian energy sector, in 2015 a similar trend happened 
due to a severe drought on the Southeast and Northeast regions caused by climate variability or climate 
change. The volume of water in the reservoirs fell below that of 2001, to 19%. As Brazil is still heavily 
reliant on hydropower generation, the hydropower generation share decreased from 91.9% to 71.3% 
between 2011 and 2015 [52], as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Electricity generation in Brazil by energy source from 1997 to 2015 (hydropower in the left 
axis and other generation sources at the right axis) [52].  
Hydropower reservoirs reached dangerously low operational levels that forced the Brazilian 
Electricity Grid Operator (ONS), to halt hydropower generation in the dams that exceeded its dead 
storage volume. To meet the demand, most available thermal power plants in the country were required 
to operate as base load in order to avoid electricity blackouts. However, this resulted in a 50 to 70% 
increase in electricity tariffs [53], and worsened the economic crisis in the country. This electricity 
supply costs increase during electricity generation deficit periods in Brazil has been modelled by Capio 
(2015) [54].   
This article is divided into six main sections. Section 2 explains some of the major causes of 
electricity crisis of 2015 and focus on seven particular causes to the crisis. There is an attempt to compare 
the contribution of each cause to the crisis. This is performed with the calculation of the overall 
electricity generation impact that each cause contributed to the crisis. Section 3 presents some of the 
impacts of the energy and water crises. These impacts focus on the supply of energy, water and food. 
Section 4 presents some suggestions from the literature and from the authors’ personal analysis to 
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prevent future energy crises. Section 5 discusses the main findings of the paper and Section 6 concludes 
the paper.  
 
2. Causes of the 2015 Energy and Water Crisis 
 The methodology used to quantify the causes of the energy crisis in Brazil compares a year with 
average operation (i.e. 2012) in the electricity sector with the crisis years (2014 and 2015). This 
comparison quantifies the amount of electricity supply reduction resulted from each cause that 
contributed to the crisis in TWh. Some causes of the 2001 crisis, which also applies to the 2015 crisis, 
such as lack of appropriate backup thermoelectric generation, unstructured energy reforms, lack of 
investment in additional generation capacity and others are discussed and referenced in the introduction 
section. The main causes for the energy crisis in Brazil in 2015 discussed in this paper are listed below 
and detailed in the following sections.  
1. Drought impact on hydropower dams. 
1.1.   Systematic vulnerability of the Brazilian electricity sector.  
1.2.   Optimistic operation of the electricity sector. 
1.3.   Generation head loss. 
2. Delay on the completion of power projects. 
3. Electricity price reduction. 
4. Outdated operational information to estimate power generation. 
Other causes for the energy crises, which are constantly published in the literature, are presented 
in Table 2. More details can be seen in [13, 14, 15, 16, 55]. 
Table 2: Usual causes of an electricity supply crises. 
Causes of an electricity supply crises 
Drought. Rapid demand growth. 
Depletion of hydropower storage reservoirs. Lack of investment in generation capacity. 
Fuel shortfall (gas, diesel, coal, oil). Power plants forced stoppage for security reasons. 
Power plant and transmission lines 
breakdowns. Steep surges in demand from heat waves or cold periods. 
Natural disasters (earthquake, tsunamis, 
wildfires). 
Heat wave impact in thermoelectric power plants. Due to 
reduction in the power plant cooling system efficiency or 
environmentally based shutdown requirements. 
Lack of funds to operate plants.  
  
2.1. Drought Impact in Hydropower Dams 
 Several authors are working on the effects of droughts over hydropower plant reservoirs [56, 
57, 58, 59]. This section presents the impact of the drought in the hydroelectric generation and proposes 
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operational improvements. The following graphs present the inflow of water entering the reservoir 
(inflow), the water passing through the dam without generating electricity (spilled), the water that passed 
through the turbine to generate electricity (turbine), and the storage percentage of the reservoir (storage). 
The outflow of the dam is the sum of the spilled and the turbine flow. The information was obtained 
from the Brazilian Electricity Grid Operator [52]. Comparing the electricity generation in 2012 with 
2015, there is a shortage of 110 TWh of hydropower generation. 
 Figure 3 (a) shows that the average inflow of the Furnas Reservoir over a year is 900 m3/s. This 
flow has a maximum hydropower potential of 4.8 GW at the cascade downstream (not considering losses 
due to depletion of the generation head). With the drought from 2013 until 2015, the inflow was reduced 
to 250 m3/s, which contributed to a generation reduction of 3.5 GW of electricity generation in the 
Grande and Paraná Rivers. In 2016 the reservoir recovered to 80% of its capacity, however, this was 
only possible as the outflow was kept low. Furnas is a very important reservoir to assure electricity 
generation during the dry period. Its storage capacity should be used as much as possible, even if the 
outflow during the wet period has to be considerably reduced.   
(a) 
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(b) 
 
(c) 
 
Figure 3: Inflow, spilled and turbine flows (m3/s), and energy storage (%) for (a) Furnas, (b) Três 
Marias (c) and Sobradinho Reservoirs. 
 Figure 3 (b) shows that the inflow at Três Marias Dam reduced from an average 600 m3/s to 
around 200 m3/s during the drought in 2014, a reduction of approximately 1.3 GW. Note that in 2014, 
the Três Marias Reservoir reached a storage level of 10%, and the Sobradinho Reservoir was maintained 
at 60%, see Figure 3 (c). This should not happen as the Sobradinho Reservoir is shallow and the flooded 
area varies from 1,145 km2 at its minimum level to 4,196 km2 at its maximum level in the driest region 
of Brazil. It is estimated that an average of 167 m3/s of water evaporates from the Sobradinho Reservoir 
[60], which is equivalent to a loss of 0.5 GW. Thus, the Três Marias Reservoir should be given 
preference to regulate the flow of the São Francisco River instead of the Sobradinho Reservoir. Note 
that this happened in 2015 as shown in Figure 3 (c). In 2015, the outlet flow at the Sobradinho Reservoir 
reduced from 2,000 m3/s to 800 m3/s. 
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 As mentioned in the introduction (Table 1), the Brazilian energy sector suffers from regular 
energy crisis, whose main reason is an extended period with lack of rain. With the intent of evaluating 
if there is a climatological pattern of rain cycles, the annual natural river flow2 [52] of the Ilha Solteira 
Dam (Paraná River) and Sobradinho Dam (São Francisco River) were analysed together with the crises 
caused by droughts. Both the Paraná and São Francisco rivers represented, respectively, 39.7% and 9.8% 
of the total power generation in Brazil in 2008 [61]. Analysing Figure 4, especially the seven years 
running average, it can be seen that the energy crisis in 2015 has a reduction in river flow. Going back 
in time it can be seen that in 2001 there was another considerable reduction in river flow. This pattern 
repeated for the crisis in the Northeast Region in 1987 and the crises of 1963 and 1953. The year of 
1971, with low rainfall, had no crisis because several dams with large reservoirs has just been recently 
built, for example Furnas and Três Marias, that could store energy for more than a year or two to supply 
the relatively low demand at that time. This pattern of 10 to 15 year drought cycles should be analysed 
in future work and taken into account when planning the Brazilian electricity sector, with the intention 
to avoid future energy crises caused by extended droughts, which seem to be inevitable. 
 
Figure 4: Annual natural river flow time series of Ilha Solteira and Sobradinho and the energy crises in 
Brazil. 
2 Natural River Flow is the estimated river flow is there were no reservoirs upstream, i.e. there is no 
interruption in the river flow.   
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2.1.1 Vulnerability of the Brazilian Electricity Sector 
Figure 5 shows that 70% of the energy storage capacity of Brazil is located in the area 
surrounded by the red line. This is a small area to contain a big share of the Brazilian energy storage 
potential. In addition, it is influenced by similar climatic conditions [62]. When there is a drought in this 
region, the energy storage reservoirs do not fill up and the country has to increase thermoelectric 
generation, increase electricity prices, reduce the demand for electricity and possibly ration electricity 
consumption. The concentration of 70% of the energy storage of the country in one region with a similar 
climatic behaviour results in a huge vulnerability for the Brazilian electricity sector and is the major 
cause for most energy crises in Brazil. 
 
Figure 5: Brazilian hydropower storage reservoirs highlighting an area with 70% of this potential [50]. 
In 1970, the energy stored in the reservoirs, when full, had the capacity to supply energy for two 
to three years [63]. Today, with the current demand for energy, the full storage reservoirs can store 
energy for only around 4 to 5 months. The total storage capacity stopped increasing, but the monthly 
demand continues to increase. In addition, new dams in the Amazon region will considerably increase 
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the generation during the wet period, however generate an insignificant amount of energy during the dry 
period. Thus, the system will rely less on energy storage, resulting in a more volatile hydrological 
variation that compromise the energy security of Brazil.  
In 2015, the storage reservoirs were very low. As shown in Figure 1, the previous energy storage 
potential were around 160 TWh at the end of the wet period. In 2015, the energy storage potential at the 
end of the wet period was 90 TWh. Compared to previous years, the energy storage potential contributed 
with only 70 TWh less in 2015.   
 
2.1.2 Optimistic Operation of the Electricity Sector 
For a hydrothermal energy system such as in Brazil, the decisions on which power plants to 
operate affect the immediate electricity prices and also have an impact on the resource availability over 
the longer term. In this case, grid operators need to apply a more complex decision process to ensure 
prudent selection of power plant operation, taking into account the uncertainty of the hydropower 
resource availability in the future. For example, if grid operators rely on hydropower plants alone and 
fail to maintain sufficient reservoir levels, hydro generation can be weakened in dry years. The shortage 
will need to be covered by traditional thermal power plants, which will result in higher electricity prices 
to the consumers. On the contrary, if the water reserve in the reservoirs is too high, the reservoirs waste 
hydropower potential in wet years, which will result in inefficient use of thermoelectric and hydropower 
resources [64]. 
In Brazil, the Brazilian Electricity Grid Operator is responsible for the generation and 
transmission of electricity. As opposed to a complex decision process that involves resource evaluation 
over a longer timeframe (as described above), ONS operates the Brazilian grid based on a minimum 
cost principle. Since hydropower plants present lower production marginal costs, they are usually 
prioritized to generate electricity. As a result, the reservoir levels are often alarmingly low which renders 
the power system vulnerable.  
Particularly at the end of 2012, ONS was far too optimistic with the Brazilian hydrology, with 
the robustness of the electricity sector and, possibly, with the intention to justify the recent low energy 
tariffs. It ordered to spill some of the water in the Furnas Reservoir (Figure 3 (a)), wasting hydroelectric 
potential, to increase peak generation in the Grande and Paraná Rivers, and reduce thermoelectric 
generation. Serra da Mesa Reservoir also spilled huge amounts of water with the intention to increase 
hydropower generation in the Tocantins River Dams, wasting huge amounts of hydropower potential. 
Even Três Marias spilled water with the same intent (Figure 3 (b)). 
This article estimates that 4 GW were wasted through spillage during the three final months of 
2012, which is equivalent to 9 TWh, due to the mistaken decision to spill water in the dams upstream to 
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generate electricity in the dams downstream. As a longer-term alternative, ONS could have generated 
electricity at that moment with thermoelectric plants. This decision unfortunately put Brazil in a fragile 
position to assure hydroelectric generation during the three following dry years, 2013, 2014 and 2015.  
 
2.1.3 Generation Head Loss 
When there is lack of rainfall, apart from the depletion of water stored in the reservoirs, the 
generation head of the storage dams reduces. With a smaller generation head, more water is required to 
generate the same amount of electricity, as in the potential energy equation. Table 3 presents the main 
storage reservoir dams and their generation reduction due to their operation with low head. As the 
drought kept the reservoirs low throughout 2014 and 2015, there was an average generation loss of 3 
GW during July 2014 and July 2015 due to head loss, which is equivalent to 25 TWh. 
Table 3: Generation loss due to generation head reduction in the main storage reservoirs. 
Dams Maximum Head (m) 
Minimum 
Head (m) 
Power 
(GW) 
Generation 
Loss (%) 
Tucuruí 65,5 43,1 8,535 34,2 
Sobradinho 27,2 15,2 1,05 44,1 
Serra da Mesa 117,2 74,5 1,275 36,4 
Três Marias 50,2 26,9 0,396 46,4 
Furnas 90 72 1,312 20,0 
Emborcação 130,3 84,3 1,192 35,3 
Itumbiara 80,2 55,2 2,28 31,2 
Bento Munhoz 135 93 1,676 31,1 
Barra Grande 148,37 118,37 0,6984 20,2       
 
 
2.2. Delay on the Completion of Power Projects 
 From 2012 to 2016 there were a series of delays in the construction of hydropower and wind 
power projects or the construction of transmission lines [65, 66, 67]. Table 4 shows the delays in the 
completion of hydropower projects as of May 2014 [68]. As these delays changed from time to time, 
for more precise analysis, the yearly “Ten-Year Energy Plan” was compared to find a more specific 
impact of the delays [51]. It is estimated that a 5.5 GW generation potential was lost between July 2014 
and July 2015 due to delays on the completion of Power Projects, which is equivalent to 48 TWh in a 
year.  
Table 4: Delay on the completion of power projects [68]. 
Dam Power (MW) 
Average 
Generation (GW) 
Delay 
(months) 
Auction 
Schedule 
Date 
Expected 
Belo Monte 11,233 4.419 15 Jan-2016 Apr-2017 
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Jirau 3,750 2.185 17 Jan-2015 Jun-2016 
Santo Antônio 3,150 2.218 18 Dec-2012 Jun-2014 
Teles Pires 1,820 0.915 9 Apr-2015 Jan-2016 
São Manoel 700 0.421 8 May-2018 Jan-2019 
Sinop 400 0.24 6 Jan-2018 Jul-2018 
Baixo Iguaçu 350 0.179 48 Jan-2013 Jan-2017 
São Roque 135 0.091 15 Jan-2016 Apr-2017 
Salto Apiacás 45 0.023 6 Jan-2018 Jul-2018 
 
2.3. Electricity Price Reduction 
The National Energy Policy number 579/2012 had the main objective of reducing the price of 
electricity for general customers, but had a negative impact on several electricity generation companies, 
especially public ones, and created uncertainties in the electricity sector [69]. ANEEL (Brazilian 
Electricity Regulatory Agency) approved on 24 January 2013 new tariffs to reduce the electricity bill. 
The average reduction was 20.2% [70]. However, as the spot market electricity price (PLD) increased 
to 269 $/MWh3 in 2014, see Figure 6, some energy intensive industries, for example steel and 
aluminium, reduced or even stopped production and sold electricity at spot market, to increase its profits. 
The reduction of electricity consumption by the industry buffered the increase in consumption in the 
other sectors and the overall energy consumption increase from 2012 to 2013 and 2014 was 2.5% and 
2.3%, respectively. With the energy sector in crisis, the electricity price reduction did not last long and 
the price of electricity to the general customer increased by around 70% from 2014 to 2015. 
3 One American dollar (USD) is assumed to worth three Brazilian reals (BRL) [116]. 
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 Figure 6: Electricity price in the spot market (PLD) [71]. 
  
2.4. Outdated Operational Information to Plan the Electricity Sector 
A number of the Brazilian hydropower dams were built several decades ago as shown in Table 
5. Some of the data used to estimate the outlet flow, power generation, storage capacity used to optimize 
the electricity sector are outdated and date from the construction of these dams. Over the years there has 
been an increase in sedimentation, reduction of the original efficiency of the turbines and changes in 
evaporation. Regular studies have been developed to update flow data [72, 73] and evaporation data 
[74]. 
Sedimentation of reservoirs affects the capacity of the reservoirs to store water, and thus energy. 
In some dams, sedimentation might have an insignificant impact in reservoirs with adequate depth and 
steep margins. However, in shallow and large reservoirs, such as the Sobradinho Reservoir, 
sedimentation can have a real impact on storage capacity. It would be appropriate to review the 
bathymetry of these shallow and large reservoirs to calculate the amount of storage loss during their 
operation.  
The outlet flow that passes through the dams is estimated by the amount of electricity generated. 
As the dams are ageing, there is an efficiency loss. With efficiency loss, a bigger flow is required to 
generate the same amount of electricity. Thus, the system operator may believe there is a lower water 
flow than the actual value recorded. A review of the turbines, reservoirs and the expected generation of 
the plants is necessary for a more precise accountability of energy and water resources. 
15 
 
Table 5: Years of construction completion and operation start-up of major dams. 
Dams Year of Completion Dams Year of Completion 
Itaipu 1982 Tucuruí 1984 
Furnas 1963 Emborcação 1977 
Sobradinho 1979 Itumbiara 1981 
Três Marias 1961 Bento Muñoz 1980 
 
Another aspect that should be taken into account is that the water extraction for agricultural, 
industrial and other uses is not properly accounted for and affects the electricity generated in the dams. 
Increased extraction of water from the river basins for agriculture and other activities is intensifying 
with irrigated plantations, especially in the São Francisco water basins [75]. It should be noted that water 
for irrigation has priority over electricity generation. However, it is important to have data on water 
extraction to improve electricity generation planning and operation.  
 
2.5. Review of the Causes of the Energy Crisis in 2015 
Table 6 presents a comparative review of the energy crisis causes discussed in Section 2. The 
loss of generation data is an estimate by the authors based on the assumptions described in each sub-
section. It allows a better understanding of the problems that most contributed to the energy crisis and 
those aspects of the electricity sector should be given priority to avoid future crises. It is outside the 
scope of this paper to show the relative importance of the “Electricity Price Reduction” and “Outdated 
Information” due to the complexity and lack of updated information on the plants, respectively. 
Table 6: Impact of each energy crisis cause between July 2014 and July 2015. 
Causes Impact (TWh) Description 
1) Drought Impact 110 
The severe drought in Brazil considerably reduced the 
hydropower generation of the country. The three causes below 
(lack of energy stored, optimistic operation and generation head 
loss) are included in the drought impact cause.  
1.1) Vulnerable System /  
Lack of Energy Stored 
70  
(from drought impact) 
Not enough energy stored during the drought reduced the 
generation capacity of the country. The cause below (optimistic 
operation) is included in the lack of energy stored impact cause. 
1.2) Optimistic Operation 
9 
(from lack of energy 
stored) 
At the end of 2012, ONS spilled water, without generating 
electricity, in the dams upstream of the main rivers with the 
intention to increase peak generation in the dams downstream.  
1.3)  Generation Head Loss 25  (from drought impact) 
The depleted storage reservoirs reduced the hydropower 
generation head in the storage reservoir. This has a considerable 
impact on the hydropower generation potential of the country.  
2) Project Delays 48 Generation and transmission project delays had a large impact on the energy crisis.   
3) Electricity Price 
Reduction - 
The electricity price reduction was buffered by the sharp 
increase in the spot market electricity price and hence, 
reduction in industrial production. Thus, it is difficult to 
estimate the impact on the increase of electricity consumption.  
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4) Outdated Information - The uncertainties in the data used to plan energy sector and the real data are unknown. 
Total 158 Note that the lack of energy stored and the generation head loss are included in the drought impact.  
 
 It was found that the drought had an overall impact of 110 TWh in hydropower generation 
between July 2014 and July 2015, from which 25 TWh were due to head loss and 70 TWh from lack of 
stored hydropower in July 2014. A share of 9 TWh from the lack of stored hydropower cause were due 
to optimistic operation of the grid in 2013. In addition, 48 TWh were not generated due to delays in the 
construction of new power plants. These impacts sums up to a reduction in power generation of 158 
TWh, not including the impacts of electricity price reduction in the increase in energy consumption, and 
the outdated operational information from power plants. 
 
3.  Impacts from the 2015 Energy and Water Crises 
The impact of curtailing services goes beyond the immediate inconvenience of a lack of 
electricity. There are many impacts resulted from the energy and water crisis in 2014-2015. Some 
selected impacts are listed below and presented in the following sections. Impacts of the 2001 crisis, 
which also applies to the 2015 crisis, are reduction in industrial production, loss of credibility of Brazil 
in the global market, reduction of foreign investment in the country and others are discussed in more 
details in the references in the introduction section. 
1) Impact on the Water Supply Sector. 
2) Impact on the Food Supply Sector. 
 
The methodology applied in this section is a qualitative and descriptive analysis based on the 
literature with the intention of highlighting the main impacts of an energy crisis to better prepare for 
future crises. It should be noted that studies on the economic impact of power rationing are scarce in the 
literature [13]. Until now, there are no comprehensive studies of the full impact of the 2001–2002 crisis 
on the Brazilian economy [13]. 
General impacts of energy crises, which are constantly published in the literature, are presented 
in Table 7. More details are presented in [13, 14, 15, 16, 55]. The impact of longer duration crises and 
chronic shortages of power is even more difficult to estimate [13]. Lack of power can deter new 
investments, job creation, and economic development in general. In countries where the power system 
is not reliable, rich customers invest in the installation of back-up generators, which significantly 
increase the cost of “doing business” [13]. 
Table 7: General impacts of an electricity supply crises. 
General impacts of an electricity supply crises 
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Electricity price increases, which impact harder on 
the poor who cannot afford the increases in price. 
Possible financial crisis in the power industry, which 
makes it more difficult to stop the energy crisis. 
Blackouts - periods of minutes, hours or days 
without electricity.  
Brownouts - periods of minutes, hours or days with a 
drop in voltage in the electrical power supply system. 
Impact on the economy, reduction in GDP or 
reduction in GDP growth. 
Reduction in production of high electricity 
consumption products, such as aluminium. 
Reduction in electricity consumption. 
Increase in CO2 emissions for electricity supply, due to 
the use of inefficient thermoelectric generation for 
base load. 
Electricity rationing. Reduced reliability of power supply. 
Loss in industrial production. High costs for recovering the entire power system during an energy crisis. 
 
 
3.1  Impact on the Water Supply Sector 
 
As the Brazilian power generation sector relies heavily on hydroelectric generation, there are 
times when the stored water is used to ensure electric generation while the water supply for other 
activities is compromised [76, 77, 78]. For example, in 2013 and 2014 much of the water stored in the 
Paraibuna Reservoir, the head of the Paraiba do Sul River Basin, was used to generate electricity due to 
the energy crisis. In January 2015, the reservoir fell below the level required for electricity generation, 
restricting water supply, and compromising the water quality in the Rio Paraiba do Sul [79]. 
As shown in Figure 7 the useful water stored volume in the Paraíba do Sul River fell from 55% 
in January 2014 to 0% in January 2015. This did not happen even in the 2001 crisis. The flow of the 
dam just before the Guandu Water Treatment plant, responsible for supplying drinking water to Rio de 
Janeiro, in September 2014 was 115 m3/s, and in September 2015, fell to 75 m3/s, not enough to supply 
water for the city of Rio de Janeiro. This shows that in 2014 water was used for electricity generation 
when it should have been conserved for water supply. For instance, the Paraibuna Dam, main head 
reservoir of the Paraíba do Sul River, reached the second half of 2014 with a storage capacity lower than 
25%, but it still discharged an average of 63.5 m3/s during the same period, when the discharge should 
have been reduced to conserve water [80]. 
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 Figure 7: Useful water storage volume in the Paraíba do Sul Reservoirs [81]. 
 A similar trend happened in the São Francisco River. As shown in Figure 3 (c) the Sobradinho 
Reservoir reached 1% of the total storage capacity at the end of 2015, which could have resulted in 
disastrous consequences for the supply of water below the dam if the wet period had not started as 
expected.  
It has reached a point that the Paraíba do Sul, São Francisco and other river basins should 
prioritised the guarantee of water supply over hydroelectric generation. They should maintain a 
minimum allowed storage level, to guarantee water supply in case of consecutive dry years. 
 
3.2  Impact on the Food Supply Sector 
 Regarding food supply, the Brazilian economy is strongly based on primary activities, such as 
agriculture and livestock. Therefore, the lack of rains during the season could result in losses in some 
crops, as well as productivity impacts on sectors like beef industry (swine, cattle and chicken), besides 
animal by-products (especially chicken eggs and milk production). 
According to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) [82], most of the 
Brazilian food industry was not impacted by droughts observed between 2013 and 2015. On the 
contrary, Table 8 show a slightly increasing trend in the slaughter of swine and chicken, as well as in 
milk and egg production. The only exception was the slaughter of cattle, which registered almost 9.6% 
reduction in 2015, in comparison with the previous year. Nevertheless, other factors not related to 
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weather conditions, like stronger international market competition and higher logistics costs, could also 
explain decreased cattle beef sales in 2015.  
Table 8: Slaughtered animals, production of animal by-products and agricultural production in the 
Brazilian food sector (2012-2016) [82]. 
Food  Sector Data 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Cattle (millions animals) 31 34 34 31 30 
Swine (millions animals) 36 36 37 39 42 
Chicken (millions animals) 5,244 5,394 5,496 5,796 5,860 
Milk from dairy cattle (106m³) 22 23 25 24 23 
Chicken eggs (106 dozens) 2,695 2,740 2,825 2,927 3,098 
Planted area (106 ha) 71 75 78 79 79 
Crop production (106 t) 968 1,038 1,015 1,043 1,036 
Yield (t/ha) 13.6 13.9 13.0 13.2 13.1 
 
 The Brazilian agricultural production data series, presented in Table 8, reveals a clear impact 
caused by lack of rainfall in 2013, 2014 and 2015. The crop productivity diminished 6.9% in 2014, in 
comparison with previous seasons, after a long period of consistent growths. In this case, it can be stated 
that weather conditions observed in 2013 and 2014, two years drier than the average, provoked a 
reduction in crop development in rural areas in Brazil. Moreover, after a slight recover in the following 
season (+2.0%), the crop yield fell once more in 2016 (-1.2%), as a side effect of rain levels in 2015, 
also lower than regular pattern. 
 
4.  Possible Solutions to Energy and Water Crises in Brazil 
This section focuses on structural solutions specifically for the crisis of the electricity sector in 
2015 in Brazil and points out some of the solutions already in place. These are presented below: 
1) Emergency strategies to face the crisis in 2015. 
2) Diversify generation sources. 
3) Increase and decentralize energy storage. 
4) Hybrid biomass generation and energy crop storage. 
5) Variable energy costs. 
  Other solutions suggested for the 2001 crisis, which still apply to the 2015 crisis, such as 
increase in reserve power capacity, increase in backup thermoelectricity generation and others are 
discussed in the introduction section. 
The methodology applied in this section is a qualitative and descriptive analysis based on the 
literature with the intention of proposing possible solutions to prevent energy and water crises in the 
future. It is outside the scope of this paper to show the relative importance of the solutions presented. 
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General solutions to energy crises, which are constantly published in the literature, are presented 
in Table 9. More details on the main characteristics, time frame, estimated cost, prerequisites and best 
practices are presented on [15, 16, 13, 83, 55, 14, 84, 85]. 
Table 9: General solutions to tackle an electricity supply crises. 
General solutions to tackle an electricity supply crises 
Demand Side Options Supply Side Options 
Increase industrial electricity tariffs. Rehabilitate existing plants and transmission. 
Increase residential electricity tariffs. Accelerate completion of plants under construction. 
Mass media campaign. Offer purchase power agreements on a short-term basis. 
Public sector energy conservation. Add capacitor banks to reduce transmission losses. 
Volunteer rationing. High speed reciprocating engines. 
Compulsory rationing. Install advanced metering systems to reduce losses. 
Efficient lighting program. Lease power generation barges, or fixed gas turbines. 
Replacement to more efficient equipment. Lease or purchase used power plant equipment. 
Daylight savings. Fuel switching. 
Shift equipment operation to off-peak hours.  Soften environmental restrains. 
Smart metering.  
 
4.1 Emergency Strategies to Face the Crisis in 2015 
 Some emergency strategies use to mitigate the energy crisis in 2015 were to increase thermal 
power generation to the maximum, accelerate completion of wind power projects, reduce demand 
through the increase of electricity price (Figure 8), allow back-up generators to operate as base load, and 
others mentioned throughout the paper. 
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Figure 8: Electricity demand, biomass and fossil fuels and wind power generation (ONS data). 
 Apart from the gas (12.0 GW), coal (3.1 GW), oil (4.8 GW) and biomass (11.0 GW) 
thermoelectric generation capacity in 2014 [51], there was an estimated 9 GW of back-up capacity with 
small-scale generators running with diesel and gas. These generators are operated mainly to generate 
electricity during peak hours for service buildings and industry, when the price of electricity is higher 
for large consumers, and to guarantee their supply of electricity. ANEEL established a policy to 
subsidise the operation of fossil fuel generators to operate as base load and reduce the need for 
hydroelectric generation [86]. Note that the contribution from these self-owned generators is not 
included in the graphs in Figure 2 and Figure 8.  
In 2015, the additional cost of thermoelectric generation was transferred to the consumer. On 
the demand side, the economic recession has led to a drop of 1.3 GW consumption from January to June 
2015 in comparison to the same period in 2014, as shown in Figure 8. Assuming that the demand was 
increasing in rate of 2 GW per year between January 2010 and January 2014, there was a relative 
reduction of 3.3 GW compared with the expected increase in demand. This reduction in demand was a 
result of the rapid increase in electricity prices for industry and the general public and it reduced the 
likelihood of energy rationing. 
 
4.2  Diversify Energy Generation Sources.  
As mentioned previously, Brazil relies heavily on hydropower generation to meet its electricity 
demand, which accounts for 78% of the electricity mix on average in the last ten years. A comparative 
study of the diversity of electricity generation by Molyneaux et al. 2012 confirmed a relatively low 
diversity in the Brazilian energy matrix, which scored a diversity index of 0.3 compared to a world 
average of 0.75 [87]. The lack of diversity in the sources of electricity supply poses a risk in generation 
stability and potential price volatility [88]. Figure 9 presents the electricity generation capacity of 2014 
and the expected electricity generation capacity in 2024. As it can be seen, the sources of energy that 
will increase percentage size are wind and solar power, with the proportional reduction in large-scale 
hydropower. The role of wind and solar power in reducing risks in the Brazilian hydro-thermal power 
systems is detailed in [89]. 
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      (a)                 (b) 
Figure 9: Brazilian generation capacity in (a) 2014 and (b) prediction for 2024 [51].  
The diversification of the Brazilian electricity grid has accelerated since the 2001 crisis, 
however, it is still happening at a slow pace. As new dams in the North are being built, this 
diversification will continue sluggish. The more diverse the energy generation sources, the more secure 
the electricity sector become [90, 91]. 
Distributed generation sources are strong candidates for the diversification of electricity 
sources, such as solar, small hydro, biomass, wind power and co-generation [92], which have a great 
potential in Brazil [93, 94].  
A specific application of decentralized generation that is very interesting in Brazil is the 
implementation of solar power to supply air-conditioning demand. This is because, the higher the solar 
irradiation, the higher the air-conditioning demand in Brazil and the higher the solar power generation. 
In order to avoid the need of inverters in this type of solar power solution, the air-conditioning system 
can operate with a direct current motor. This is a more affordable and efficient solution to supply peak 
air-conditioning demand in large buildings.  
 
4.3. Increase and Decentralize Energy Storage 
Hydroelectric generation capacity is predicted to increase 36% by 2024 but the energy storage 
capacity is expected to increase only 0.9% by 2024 [51], which will be 216 TWh, equivalent to a 
generation of 23 GW for a whole year. As the Brazilian Government still wants to develop its 
hydropower capacity to keep generating most of its electricity from hydropower, there is the need to 
increase the country’s storage capacity. 
Recently, the remaining hydraulic energy storage potential in Brazil was assessed [95]. From a 
portfolio of 180 identified projects, the 25 best total 34.1 TWh, from which 54% represents a smaller 
23 
 
environmental and social impacts. However, the Ministry of Mines and Energy have not yet considered 
these projects for future studies. 
An efficient approach to increase the energy storage of Brazil is with Seasonal-Pumped-Storage 
(SPS). Apart from storing energy in daily and weekly cycles, SPS has also the possibility to have an 
overall yearly storage cycle. Figure 10 (a) presents the convectional hydropower cascade generation 
scheme where the reservoir dams are located upstream the river controlling the hydropower generation 
in the dams downstream. With the combination of a SPS plant and hydroelectric dams in cascade, as 
shown in Figure 10 (b) and (c), it is possible to increase the water basin storage capacity with a new 
reservoir built in parallel to the river basin. Water can then be pumped to the SPS reservoir or used for 
generating electricity in accordance with the country’s needs for energy storage and power generation 
[50]. Figure 10 (b) represents the overall water flux in the water basin with a SPS plant during the wet 
period. The exceeding electricity in the grid, at night and during weekends, is used to pump water to the 
SPS upper reservoir storing energy and reducing the generation in the dams in cascade downstream. The 
energy storage process in the SPS has an efficiency of 70 to 75%. With the inclusion of the cascade, the 
overall storage efficiency increases considerably and may even result in a net generation gain. This 
happens if the increase in storage upstream the river basin reduces the water spillage of the dams in 
cascade downstream the SPS plant. During the dry period or when there is a shortage of energy in the 
grid, such as in daytime, SPS generates electricity using the stored water and increases the generation 
of the dams in cascade downstream, as shown in Figure 10 (c) [50]. 
 
    (a)                (b)     (c) 
Figure 10: Operation of (a) conventional hydroelectric plants (b) SPS during periods of high water 
availability (c) SPS during periods of low water availability. 
The Brazilian south is an interesting location to install a Seasonal-Pumped-Storage plant 
because, while there were a drought in the Southeast regions in 2001 and 2015, there was an increase in 
rainfall in the Southern region, which resulted in a considerable water spillage in the dams. This would 
increase the overall energy security of the country because if there is no water to store energy in the 
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Southeast region, water from the South region can be used to store energy. The 13 projects presented in 
[96] have the potential to increase the Brazilian storage capacity by 140%. 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 11: Estimated hydropower generation for 2023 (a) without SPS (b) and with SPS [97].  
 
The main objective of SPS in the Brazilian energy sector is to complement the highly seasonal 
hydroelectric generation profile, which is predicted to have a similar pattern to the graph in Figure 11 
(a) in 2023. The hydropower seasonality becomes more apparent in 2023 due to the completion of new 
dams in the Amazon region without storage reservoirs. Thus, there will be considerably more 
hydropower generated during the wet period.  
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As shown in Figure 11 (b), to resolve this generation imbalance, one to three SPS plants with a 
summed installed capacity of 3 GW could be used pump an average of 0.5 to 2 GW monthly (Pumping 
in the SPS) during the wet period, storing energy and water. This would reduce the hydropower 
generation in the dams downstream in a monthly average of 1 to 3.5 GW (Generation Reduction). During 
the dry period, the SPS would generate an average of 0.4 – 1.5 GW (Generation in the SPS), including 
the 25% losses, and would increase the generation in the dams downstream at an average of 1 to 3.5 
GW (Downstream Generation). In his way, a few SPS projects could change the Brazilian hydropower 
profile to the generation profile shown in Figure 11 (b). This way the seasonality caused by the 
hydropower generation in the Amazon region, without storage, can be resolved with SPS projects with 
a total installed capacity of 3 GW.   
 
4.4 Hybrid Biomass Generation and Energy Crop Storage 
A study of sugar-cane bagasse boilers shows that other biomass, such as eucalyptus, could be 
burned in the same boiler during the sugarcane off-season months [98]. This study shows an overall gain 
of 12.6 TWh per year with hybrid biomass generation with the already installed sugarcane based biomass 
generation capacity. This generation potential during the wet period could be used during a drought, to 
complement the lack of hydropower generation. At the moment, the residual heat is used in the sugar 
and ethanol production process. In order to generate only electricity during the off-season, combined 
cycle should be included to increase the overall efficiency of electricity generation. Brazil has a great 
potential for agricultural residues based electricity generation, other than sugarcane bagasse that should 
be explored. 
Energy Crop Storage (ECS) is a concept that provides long-term storage in energy crops with 
the intention to reduce the yearly variation of electricity supply. The main concept behind the ECS 
scheme is to allow eucalyptus or other plantations to grow when there is a year with less need to generate 
thermoelectricity and to use the biomass stored in a year with emergence need for thermoelectricity. For 
example, in a year with good rainfall, during the dry period, the biomass power plant would operate at 
full load and, during the wet period, it would not operate, as most of the electricity would be generated 
with hydropower, resulting in an overall capacity factor of 50%. This would allow the eucalyptus 
plantations to grow higher, storing extra biomass for future use. In a dry year, the plant would operate 
near full capacity throughout the whole year, which could result in a capacity factor close to 90%. This 
would then consume the biomass previously stored in the eucalyptus plantation, as the plantation 
reached a higher average height. This scheme is explained in Figure 12. More details can be seen in 
[99]. 
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 Figure 12: Energy Crop Storage scheme suited to accommodate the Brazilian Energy Sector. 
4.5 Variable Energy Costs  
 The Brazilian Government initiated in 2015 a price variation scheme to give more flexibility to 
the cost of electricity with the intention to repay the higher costs resulting from thermal electricity 
generation. The scheme also has the intention to conserve electricity by reducing electricity 
consumption. Four different levels of price tariffs were created, the Green Flag, the cheapest option with 
no increase to the tariff, the Yellow Flag, with an increase of $ 3.75/MWh, and the Red Flag, which is 
divided into two levels, level one with an increase of $ 7.5/MWh, and level 2 with an increase of $ 
11.25/MWh [100].   
During the wet period, Brazilian hydropower will supply most of the electricity demand. 
However, during the dry period, thermoelectricity will guarantee the supply. Thus, it is expected that in 
the short-term the Green, Yellow and Red flags might behave predominantly as shown in Figure 13, due 
to the lack of energy storage and the need for thermoelectricity generation during the dry period. During 
the wet period, the price of electricity is low (Green Flag), then during the months of June, July and 
November, in the dry period, when the hydrology is not favourable, the price of electricity is at an 
average level (Yellow Flag), and during the worst months of the dry period, August, September and 
October, the price of electricity reaches its maximum (Red Flag). Therefore, financial return on electric 
self-generation will be higher during the dry season. This is presented in more details in the PDE 2026 
[101]. 
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 Figure 13: Likely changes in electricity costs over a typical year. 
 
5.  Discussion 
This paper discussed the considerable risk Brazil is accepting owing to more than 70% of its 
electricity matrix being based on unpredictable hydropower generation. Considering that Brazil has 
several electricity generation source alternatives, the country should diversify its power generation 
portfolio. Electricity auctions and policies should continue to incentive different energy resources within 
the country. 
Brazil presents huge potential to harness renewable energy in all its 27 states, especially for 
electricity generation. In the Northeast region, wind power generation has increased exponentially, 
owing to regular public auctions realized since 2009. The increase in wind generation is expected to 
continue. From 2014 on, solar power is emerging as a promising option for the Northeast states, in poor 
municipalities that present the highest solar potential in the country. 
The Midwest region the economy is based on livestock and agriculture. Thus, there is a 
considerable amount of residues, mainly from cattle and soybeans, which could be used to produce 
biogas, burned or gasified to generate electricity and reduce greenhouse gases emissions. Nevertheless, 
these resources are wasted every year. In North region, where most of the Amazon rainforest is located, 
biomass and small hydropower plants are the most suitable options to avoid oil and diesel consumption 
in small power generators. There is also the possibility to build new large run-of-the river dams in the 
region.   
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The Southeast region is where the major cities are located and concentrates most of Brazilian 
industries. There is a large potential for distributed generation, especially solar power, and for biomass, 
such as residues from livestock, as well as sugarcane bagasse. Lastly, the South region also has a great 
wind generation potential, which has been harnessed. Wind generation in South region is expected to 
increase. The region also has great potential with biogas from pig farms and biomass from agriculture 
residues. 
Another alternative proposed in this paper to increase the energy security of the country is to 
increase the energy storage capacity with Seasonal-Pumped-Storage power plants. With SPS, the 
variation of electricity generation can be controlled with the increase in energy storage. In case of a 
drought, the energy stored in SPS plants and the thermoelectric plants will have a much better capability 
of guaranteeing the energy supply of the country.  
SPS plants are in operation in several countries, especially in countries with a high presence of 
hydropower generation, such as Austria [102, 103], Switzerland [104], Norway [105], Sweden [106] 
and the State of Washington [107]. Countries that used to have a high share of hydropower generation, 
such as Italy and France also have SPS plants [108]. These SPS plans not only store energy seasonally, 
they generate electricity during peak hours, store energy for weekly variations, reduce the intermittency 
of renewable energy sources, reduce transmission costs, increase the country’s energy security, 
contribute for water supply in irrigation projects and provides ancillary services. 
As mentioned in Section 2.1, Brazil suffers with severe hydropower reductions with cyclical 
patterns of 10 to 15 years. SPS plants could be designed with pluri-annual storage capacities and store 
energy during years with high hydropower availability and generate electricity during years of low 
hydropower availability. Energy security is an important aspect that should be taken into account when 
planning of the electricity sector, with the focus on reducing the risks of energy crises and improving 
quality of supply.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
The paper discusses the major underlying causes that led Brazil to the 2015 electricity crisis. It 
shows that the drought in 2015 had an impact of 110 TWh in hydropower generation, from which 25 
TWh are due to head loss and 70 TWh are from lack of stored hydropower in July of 2014. From the 
lack of stored hydropower, 9 TWh were due to optimistic operation of the grid in 2012 and 2013. In 
addition, 48 TWh were not generated due to delays in the construction of new power plants. Other 
causes, such as electricity price reduction and outdated information to plan the electricity sector were 
analysed qualitatively. 
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Analysing the natural river flow of key dams from 1931 until 2017, this paper suggests that 
hydropower generation in Brazil has a cyclical pattern with 10 to 15 years, in which there are consecutive 
years with higher than the average hydropower generation and others with lower than the average 
hydropower generation. The periods of drought in this cyclical pattern usually coincides with energy 
crises periods due to the reduction in hydropower generation. 
As Brazil relies heavily on hydropower for electricity generation, during droughts the need for 
electricity generation can affect the supply of water for other uses. This happened to the Paraiba do Sul 
River, where water was used for electricity generation and it reached a point that there were restrictions 
in the supply of drinking water to the population. Another impact from the water crisis happens in the 
agriculture and livestock sectors, where the lack of rain contributed to a reduction in productivity.   
Strategic measures identified to reduce future crises are to increase thermal power generation to 
the maximum; allow back-up generators to operate as base load; promote the reduction of demand 
through electricity prices increase and to further promote wind generation.  
With the intention of preventing future energy crises, the paper then shows the potential 
alternatives to improve electricity supply security in Brazil. This is proposed particularly in terms of the 
creation of variable energy costs; diversifying and widening the share of renewable sources, such as 
hybrid biomass generation; and decentralizing the country energy storage potential with seasonal 
pumped-storage and energy crop storage.  
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